fix(security): normalize IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses in SSRF checks

::ffff:127.0.0.1 and ::ffff:169.254.169.254 are IPv6Address objects
that match neither the IPv4 blocklists (127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16)
nor the IPv6 ones (::1/128), allowing SSRF bypass via DNS responses
that return IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses.

Add _normalize_addr() to convert ipv4_mapped IPv6 addresses to their
IPv4 form before blocklist/allowlist matching.
This commit is contained in:
yorkhellen 2026-05-29 23:57:25 +08:00 committed by Xubin Ren
parent 1d4000560d
commit 13dec9d2c2
2 changed files with 66 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -36,10 +36,26 @@ def configure_ssrf_whitelist(cidrs: list[str]) -> None:
_allowed_networks = nets
def _normalize_addr(
addr: ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address,
) -> ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address:
"""Normalize IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses to their IPv4 form.
``::ffff:127.0.0.1`` is semantically identical to ``127.0.0.1`` but
Python's ipaddress treats it as an IPv6Address that matches neither
``127.0.0.0/8`` nor ``::1/128``. Converting it to IPv4 ensures
blocklist/allowlist checks work correctly.
"""
if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
return addr.ipv4_mapped
return addr
def _is_private(addr: ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address) -> bool:
if _allowed_networks and any(addr in net for net in _allowed_networks):
normalized = _normalize_addr(addr)
if _allowed_networks and any(normalized in net for net in _allowed_networks):
return False
return any(addr in net for net in _BLOCKED_NETWORKS)
return any(normalized in net for net in _BLOCKED_NETWORKS)
def validate_url_target(url: str, *, allow_loopback: bool = False) -> tuple[bool, str]:

View File

@ -62,6 +62,54 @@ def test_blocks_ipv6_loopback():
assert not ok
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_url_target — IPv6-mapped IPv4 bypass prevention
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _fake_resolve_v6(host: str, results: list[str]):
"""Like _fake_resolve but returns AF_INET6 tuples for IPv6 addresses."""
def _resolver(hostname, port, family=0, type_=0):
if hostname == host:
entries = []
for ip in results:
if ":" in ip:
entries.append((socket.AF_INET6, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, "", (ip, 0, 0, 0)))
else:
entries.append((socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, "", (ip, 0)))
return entries
raise socket.gaierror(f"cannot resolve {hostname}")
return _resolver
def test_blocks_ipv6_mapped_loopback():
"""::ffff:127.0.0.1 must be blocked just like 127.0.0.1."""
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_v6("evil.com", ["::ffff:127.0.0.1"])):
ok, err = validate_url_target("http://evil.com/")
assert not ok
assert "blocked" in err.lower()
def test_blocks_ipv6_mapped_metadata():
"""::ffff:169.254.169.254 must be blocked just like 169.254.169.254."""
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_v6("evil.com", ["::ffff:169.254.169.254"])):
ok, err = validate_url_target("http://evil.com/")
assert not ok
def test_blocks_ipv6_mapped_rfc1918():
"""::ffff:10.0.0.1 must be blocked just like 10.0.0.1."""
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_v6("evil.com", ["::ffff:10.0.0.1"])):
ok, err = validate_url_target("http://evil.com/")
assert not ok
def test_allows_public_ipv6():
"""Public IPv6 addresses must still be allowed."""
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_v6("example.com", ["2606:4700::6810:84e5"])):
ok, err = validate_url_target("http://example.com/")
assert ok, f"Should allow public IPv6, got: {err}"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_url_target — allows public IPs
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------