fix(agent): prevent safety guard false positives and streamed message drop

Three independent fixes for issues exposed by PR #3493:

1. shell.py: allow /dev/* paths in workspace guard
   Commands like `rm file.txt 2>/dev/null` were blocked because
   _extract_absolute_paths captured /dev/null as a path outside
   the workspace. Allow /dev like media_path is already allowed.

2. shell.py: remove | from home_paths regex prefix
   Loki query operator `|~` was misinterpreted as pipe + home
   directory, causing false workspace violation errors.

3. loop.py: change _streamed from blacklist to whitelist
   stop_reason "tool_error" was not in the exclusion set
   {"ask_user", "error"}, so _streamed=True was set on fatal
   errors. channel manager then skipped channel.send() because
   it assumed the content was already streamed — but it never
   was. Whitelist to only {"stop", "end_turn", "max_tokens"}.

Also fixes a pre-existing Windows bug in _spawn where
create_subprocess_exec + list2cmdline breaks commands with
paths containing spaces (e.g. D:\Program Files\python.exe).

Closes: #3599, #3605
This commit is contained in:
chengyongru 2026-05-04 00:59:47 +08:00 committed by Xubin Ren
parent 2a7433b7ec
commit d3689d143c
4 changed files with 45 additions and 20 deletions

View File

@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ class AgentLoop:
ask_user_options_from_messages(all_msgs) if stop_reason == "ask_user" else [], ask_user_options_from_messages(all_msgs) if stop_reason == "ask_user" else [],
msg.channel, msg.channel,
) )
if on_stream is not None and stop_reason not in {"ask_user", "error"}: if on_stream is not None and stop_reason not in {"ask_user", "error", "tool_error"}:
meta["_streamed"] = True meta["_streamed"] = True
return OutboundMessage( return OutboundMessage(
channel=msg.channel, channel=msg.channel,

View File

@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
) -> asyncio.subprocess.Process: ) -> asyncio.subprocess.Process:
"""Launch *command* in a platform-appropriate shell.""" """Launch *command* in a platform-appropriate shell."""
if _IS_WINDOWS: if _IS_WINDOWS:
comspec = env.get("COMSPEC", os.environ.get("COMSPEC", "cmd.exe")) # create_subprocess_exec re-quotes args via list2cmdline, which
return await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec( # breaks commands containing paths with spaces (e.g. "D:\Program
comspec, "/c", command, # Files\python.exe" "script.py"). create_subprocess_shell passes
# the raw command string to COMSPEC without re-quoting.
return await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(
command,
stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE, stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE, stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
cwd=cwd, cwd=cwd,
@ -346,11 +349,14 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
continue continue
media_path = get_media_dir().resolve() media_path = get_media_dir().resolve()
dev_path = Path("/dev").resolve()
if (p.is_absolute() if (p.is_absolute()
and cwd_path not in p.parents and cwd_path not in p.parents
and p != cwd_path and p != cwd_path
and media_path not in p.parents and media_path not in p.parents
and p != media_path and p != media_path
and dev_path not in p.parents
and p != dev_path
): ):
return ( return (
"Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)" "Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"
@ -372,5 +378,5 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
# NOTE: `*` is required so `C:\` (nothing after the slash) is still extracted. # NOTE: `*` is required so `C:\` (nothing after the slash) is still extracted.
win_paths = re.findall(r"[A-Za-z]:\\[^\s\"'|><;]*", command) win_paths = re.findall(r"[A-Za-z]:\\[^\s\"'|><;]*", command)
posix_paths = re.findall(r"(?:^|[\s|>'\"])(/[^\s\"'>;|<]+)", command) # POSIX: /absolute only posix_paths = re.findall(r"(?:^|[\s|>'\"])(/[^\s\"'>;|<]+)", command) # POSIX: /absolute only
home_paths = re.findall(r"(?:^|[\s|>'\"])(~[^\s\"'>;|<]*)", command) # POSIX/Windows home shortcut: ~ home_paths = re.findall(r"(?:^|[\s>'\"])(~[^\s\"'>;|<]*)", command) # POSIX/Windows home shortcut: ~
return win_paths + posix_paths + home_paths return win_paths + posix_paths + home_paths

View File

@ -112,33 +112,31 @@ class TestSpawnUnix:
class TestSpawnWindows: class TestSpawnWindows:
@pytest.mark.asyncio @pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_uses_comspec_from_env(self): async def test_uses_create_subprocess_shell(self):
env = {"COMSPEC": r"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe", "PATH": ""} env = {"COMSPEC": r"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe", "PATH": ""}
with ( with (
patch("nanobot.agent.tools.shell._IS_WINDOWS", True), patch("nanobot.agent.tools.shell._IS_WINDOWS", True),
patch("asyncio.create_subprocess_exec", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_exec, patch("asyncio.create_subprocess_shell", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_shell,
): ):
mock_exec.return_value = AsyncMock() mock_shell.return_value = AsyncMock()
await ExecTool._spawn("dir", r"C:\Users", env) await ExecTool._spawn("dir", r"C:\work", env)
args = mock_exec.call_args[0] args = mock_shell.call_args[0]
assert "cmd.exe" in args[0]
assert "/c" in args
assert "dir" in args assert "dir" in args
@pytest.mark.asyncio @pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_falls_back_to_default_comspec(self): async def test_passes_cwd_and_env(self):
env = {"PATH": ""} env = {"PATH": "/usr/bin"}
with ( with (
patch("nanobot.agent.tools.shell._IS_WINDOWS", True), patch("nanobot.agent.tools.shell._IS_WINDOWS", True),
patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=True), patch("asyncio.create_subprocess_shell", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_shell,
patch("asyncio.create_subprocess_exec", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_exec,
): ):
mock_exec.return_value = AsyncMock() mock_shell.return_value = AsyncMock()
await ExecTool._spawn("dir", r"C:\Users", env) await ExecTool._spawn("echo hi", r"C:\work", env)
args = mock_exec.call_args[0] kwargs = mock_shell.call_args[1]
assert args[0] == "cmd.exe" assert kwargs["cwd"] == r"C:\work"
assert kwargs["env"] == env
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

View File

@ -315,6 +315,27 @@ def test_exec_guard_blocks_windows_drive_root_outside_workspace(monkeypatch) ->
assert "hard policy boundary" in error assert "hard policy boundary" in error
def test_exec_guard_allows_dev_null_redirect(tmp_path) -> None:
tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)
ws = tmp_path / "workspace"
ws.mkdir()
(ws / "file.txt").write_text("ok", encoding="utf-8")
error = tool._guard_command(f'rm "{ws / "file.txt"}" 2>/dev/null', str(ws))
assert error is None
def test_exec_guard_allows_dev_urandom(tmp_path) -> None:
tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)
error = tool._guard_command("cat /dev/urandom | head -c 16 > random.bin", str(tmp_path))
assert error is None
def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_ignores_pipe_tilde() -> None:
cmd = "python query.py --query '{job=\"app\"} |~ \"error\"'"
paths = ExecTool._extract_absolute_paths(cmd)
assert not any(p.startswith("~") for p in paths)
# --- cast_params tests --- # --- cast_params tests ---