fix(webui): require proxy-generated auth assertions

docs/deployment.md

@@ -116,11 +116,13 @@ This is two-part authorization: a trusted direct loopback peer **and** a
 non-empty Cloudflare Access assertion. A trusted CIDR alone is not a bypass.
 For this flow `/webui/bootstrap` returns connection metadata without a
 bootstrap token or REST API token; the proxy assertion authorizes the WebSocket
-handshake and REST requests directly. Nanobot trusts the assertion but does
+handshake and REST requests directly. The assertion header must be generated
+by Cloudflare Access after authentication; routing/client metadata headers such
+as `Host`, `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Real-IP`, and `CF-Connecting-IP`
+are rejected as `assertionHeader` values. Nanobot trusts the assertion but does
 not cryptographically validate the JWT, so configure the tunnel and Access
 policy carefully and do not expose the nanobot listener directly to untrusted
-clients. Forwarded client headers such as `X-Forwarded-For` do not establish
-proxy trust.
+clients. Forwarded client headers do not establish proxy trust.
 
 ### Docker Compose
 

docs/websocket.md

@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ All fields go under `channels.websocket` in `config.json`.
 | `tokenIssueSecret` | string | `""` | Secret required to obtain tokens via the issue endpoint. If empty, any client can obtain WebSocket connection tokens from `tokenIssuePath` (logged as a warning). `/webui/bootstrap` issues tokens for local/secret-authenticated requests; trusted-proxy requests intentionally receive no bootstrap or API token. |
 | `trustedProxyAuth` | object or `null` | `null` | Optional two-part no-token authorization for a directly connected upstream proxy. Both `trustedPeerCidrs` and a non-empty `assertionHeader` value must match; a CIDR alone never authorizes bootstrap or WebSocket/API access. |
 | `trustedProxyAuth.trustedPeerCidrs` | list of CIDR strings | — | Direct TCP peer networks that may present the assertion. IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 peers are supported; universal CIDRs (`0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`) are rejected. |
-| `trustedProxyAuth.assertionHeader` | string | — | HTTP header whose non-empty value proves the upstream proxy authenticated the request. Nanobot trusts this value but does not cryptographically validate it. |
+| `trustedProxyAuth.assertionHeader` | string | — | Header injected by the identity-aware proxy after successful authentication. Routing/client metadata headers (`Host`, `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`) are rejected; nanobot trusts the remaining header's non-empty value but does not cryptographically validate it. |
 | `tokenTtlS` | int | `300` | Time-to-live for issued tokens in seconds (30 – 86,400). |
 
 ### Access Control
@@ -296,6 +296,12 @@ assertion supplied by the explicitly trusted peer, but does not cryptographicall
 validate or interpret the JWT/assertion contents. Do not enable this option if
 untrusted clients can connect directly to the nanobot listener.
 
+The configured assertion header must be a proxy-generated authentication
+assertion, not a routing or client metadata header. Headers such as `Host`,
+`Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Real-IP`, and `CF-Connecting-IP` are rejected
+by configuration; use the identity provider's post-authentication assertion
+header instead (for example, `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`).
+
 For example, a local Cloudflare Tunnel with Cloudflare Access can validate the
 user at the edge and forward the resulting `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`:
 

nanobot/channels/websocket/runtime.py

@@ -93,6 +93,24 @@ from nanobot.webui.websocket_logging import websockets_server_logger
 _WEBUI_HTTP_OPEN_TIMEOUT_S = 360.0
 
 
+_ROUTING_ASSERTION_HEADERS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "host",
+        "forwarded",
+        "x-forwarded-for",
+        "x-forwarded-host",
+        "x-forwarded-proto",
+        "x-real-ip",
+        "cf-connecting-ip",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _is_routing_assertion_header(value: str) -> bool:
+    normalized = value.casefold()
+    return normalized in _ROUTING_ASSERTION_HEADERS or normalized.startswith("x-forwarded-")
+
+
 class TrustedProxyAuthConfig(Base):
     """Authentication assertions accepted from explicitly trusted proxy peers."""
 
@@ -128,6 +146,11 @@ class TrustedProxyAuthConfig(Base):
         value = value.strip()
         if not value or any(char.isspace() or ord(char) < 0x21 for char in value):
             raise ValueError("assertion_header must be a valid HTTP header name")
+        if _is_routing_assertion_header(value):
+            raise ValueError(
+                "assertion_header must identify a proxy-generated authentication assertion, "
+                "not a routing or client metadata header"
+            )
         return value
 
     @model_validator(mode="after")

nanobot/channels/websocket/tests/test_websocket_http_routes.py

@@ -3473,6 +3473,16 @@ def test_trusted_proxy_rejects_invalid_or_universal_cidrs(
     with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
         WebSocketConfig.model_validate(_trusted_proxy_config([cidr]))
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "assertion_header",
+    ["Host", "Forwarded", "X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP", "CF-Connecting-IP"],
+)
+def test_trusted_proxy_rejects_routing_headers(assertion_header: str) -> None:
+    from pydantic_core import ValidationError
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="proxy-generated"):
+        WebSocketConfig.model_validate(_trusted_proxy_config(assertion_header=assertion_header))
+
 def test_wildcard_host_without_auth_raises_on_startup(bus: MagicMock) -> None:
     import pytest
     from pydantic_core import ValidationError