This commit implements a progressive refactoring of the tool system to support
plugin discovery, scoped loading, and protocol-driven runtime context injection.
Key changes:
- Add Tool ABC metadata (tool_name, _scopes) and ToolContext dataclass for
dependency injection.
- Introduce ToolLoader with pkgutil-based builtin discovery and
entry_points-based third-party plugin loading.
- Add scope filtering (core/subagent/memory) so different contexts load
appropriate tool sets.
- Introduce ContextAware protocol and RequestContext dataclass to replace
hardcoded per-tool context injection in AgentLoop.
- Add RuntimeState / MutableRuntimeState protocols to decouple MyTool from
AgentLoop.
- Migrate all built-in tools to declare scopes and implement create()/enabled()
hooks.
- Migrate MessageTool, SpawnTool, CronTool, and MyTool to ContextAware.
- Refactor AgentLoop to use ToolLoader and protocol-driven context injection.
- Refactor SubagentManager to use ToolLoader(scope="subagent") with per-run
FileStates isolation.
- Register all built-in tools via pyproject.toml entry_points.
- Add comprehensive tests for loader scopes, entry_points, ContextAware,
subagent tools, and runtime state sync.
- Append [Archived Context Summary] to system prompt instead of injecting
it into the user message runtime context, improving KV cache reuse across
turns and avoiding consecutive same-role messages.
- _last_summary persists in metadata (no pop) for restart survival;
summary is re-injected every turn via the stable system prompt.
- Remove dynamic "Inactive for X minutes" from _format_summary — use
static last_active timestamp instead to preserve KV cache stability.
- Pass session_summary through build_messages() so both normal and
ask_user paths receive the archived summary in the system prompt.
- estimate_session_prompt_tokens now reads _last_summary from metadata
to include the summary in token budget estimation.
- Remove obsolete session_summary parameter from
maybe_consolidate_by_tokens and estimate_session_prompt_tokens
call sites in loop.py (summary flows through build_messages instead).
- Ensure /new (session.clear()) clears _last_summary from metadata.
The previous implementation popped _last_summary from session.metadata
after injecting it into the prompt, then saved the session. This caused
the summary to be permanently lost after a process restart, making the
AI forget archived context and appear to ignore memory or reference
non-existent previous messages.
Replace the destructive pop with a _last_summary_used sentinel:
- _last_summary stays in metadata for restart survival
- _last_summary_used prevents duplicate injection within the same turn
- Clear the sentinel whenever a new summary is generated
Updates tests to match the new persistence behavior.
Fixes two related input-handling bugs in the onboard wizard:
1. _input_text treated "" as None, preventing users from clearing
optional string fields or entering empty strings intentionally.
2. _input_model_with_autocomplete used `if value else None`, which
discarded falsy values such as empty strings or 0.
To support clearing optional string fields, add _is_str_or_none() and
normalize empty strings to None inside _configure_pydantic_model only
when the field annotation is `str | None`. Required str fields keep
"" as a valid value.
Also included:
- Remember last selected item in provider/channel/model menus for
better UX when configuring multiple items.
- Rename _SIMPLE_TYPES and _MENU_DISPATCH to lowercase to follow
Python naming conventions (they are local variables, not constants).
- Remove unused imports in test file.
Extracted from PR #3358.
Track the Dream cursor in memory versioning so restores do not skip history after rolling back Dream commits.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Align the WebUI sidebar and chat chrome with the updated design, and generate WebUI session titles asynchronously without blocking turns.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The is_path branch in _fmt_known was not passing max_length to
abbreviate_path, so read_file, write_file, edit, list_dir, and
web_fetch always truncated paths at 40 chars regardless of config.
Now all three branches (is_path, is_command, fallback) honor the
configured toolHintMaxLength.
Add to config (default: 40, range: 20-500).
Controls how many characters of tool hints are shown in progress updates
(e.g. '$ cd …/project && npm test').
Set to 120+ to see full commands instead of truncated hints:
```json
{
"agents": {
"defaults": {
"toolHintMaxLength": 120
}
}
}
```
- Thread max_length through format_tool_hints → _fmt_known/_fmt_mcp/_fmt_fallback
- Make path abbreviation in _abbreviate_command proportional to max_length
- Add TestToolHintMaxLength test class with 5 tests
- All 41 existing tests pass
Keep private URL access blocked at the tool boundary, but return a clear non-retryable hint so the agent can recover conversationally instead of aborting the turn.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Replace the asyncio.Semaphore queueing approach with a simple count
check in SpawnTool.execute(). When the concurrency limit is reached,
the tool returns an error string so the agent can perceive the reason
and adjust its behavior instead of silently queueing.
- Remove max_concurrent_subagents parameter threading through
AgentLoop, commands.py, and nanobot.py
- SubagentManager reads the limit directly from AgentDefaults
- SpawnTool checks get_running_count() before calling spawn()
- Simplify tests to verify rejection behavior
Keep the /dev workspace guard exception scoped to the known benign device paths already handled by ExecTool, and add coverage that non-benign /dev targets still get blocked. Also add a streaming regression for tool_error responses so fatal tool failures are delivered by channels instead of being marked as already streamed.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Replaces PR #3493's blanket fatal abort with a "tell the model + throttle
the bypass loop" policy. Workspace-bound rejections are now ordinary
recoverable tool errors enriched with a structured "this is a hard policy
boundary" instruction; SSRF stays the only marker that aborts the turn.
Why the fatal-abort approach broke
----------------------------------
PR #3493 promoted every shell `_guard_command` and filesystem path-resolution
rejection to a turn-fatal RuntimeError. Two of those messages (`path
outside working dir` and `path traversal detected`) are heuristic substring
scans on the raw command, so legitimate commands like `rm <ws>/x.txt
2>/dev/null` or `find . -type f` killed the user's turn (#3599). On
channels with outbound dedupe (Telegram) the user just saw silence (#3605),
and the noise polluted the LLM's context until it started hallucinating
guard rejections on plain relative paths (#3597).
Why we still need *some* throttle
---------------------------------
The original #3493 pain point was real: the LLM, refused once, would
swap tools and try again -- read_file -> exec cat -> exec cp -> bash -c
-> ln -sf -> python -c open(...). Just removing the fatal escape lets
that loop run wild until max_iterations.
What this commit does
---------------------
- `nanobot/utils/runtime.py`: add `workspace_violation_signature` and
`repeated_workspace_violation_error`. The signature normalizes
filesystem `path` arguments and the first absolute path inside an
exec command, so swapping tools against the same outside target hits
the same throttle bucket. Two soft attempts are allowed; the third
attempt's tool result is replaced with a hard "stop trying to bypass"
message that quotes the target path and tells the model to ask the
user for help.
- `nanobot/agent/runner.py`: split classification into `_is_ssrf_violation`
(still fatal) and `_is_workspace_violation` (now soft). All three
failure branches in `_run_tool` (prep_error / exception / Error
result) route through a shared `_classify_violation` that bumps the
per-turn workspace_violation_counts dict and either keeps the tool's
own message or substitutes the throttle escalation. `_execute_tools`
now threads that dict alongside the existing external_lookup_counts.
- `nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py`: append a structured boundary note to
every workspace-bound guard rejection (`working_dir could not be
resolved`, `working_dir is outside`, `path outside working dir`,
`path traversal detected`). SSRF errors stay short and direct so the
model doesn't try to "phrase around" them. Existing `2>/dev/null`
allow-list and benign device passthrough from the previous commit
remain.
- `nanobot/agent/tools/filesystem.py`: append the same boundary note to
the `outside allowed directory` PermissionError so read_file / write_file
/ list_dir errors give the LLM the same explicit hint.
Tests
-----
- `tests/utils/test_workspace_violation_throttle.py` (new): signature
collapses across read_file/exec/python -c against the same path,
different paths get independent budgets, escalation only fires after
the third attempt.
- `tests/agent/test_runner.py`:
- `test_runner_does_not_abort_on_workspace_violation_anymore` -- v2
contract: filesystem PermissionError is now soft, runner moves to
the next iteration and finalizes cleanly.
- `test_is_ssrf_violation_remains_fatal` + the existing
`test_runner_aborts_on_ssrf_violation` -- SSRF still aborts on the
first attempt.
- `test_runner_lets_llm_recover_from_shell_guard_path_outside` -- end
to end recovery from `path outside working dir`.
- `test_runner_throttles_repeated_workspace_bypass_attempts` -- four
bypass attempts against the same outside target produce at least
one `workspace_violation_escalated` event and the run completes
naturally without aborting the turn.
- The two `_execute_tools` direct-call tests now pass the new
workspace_violation_counts dict.
- `tests/tools/test_tool_validation.py`: relax three `==` assertions
to `startswith` + "hard policy boundary" substring check to match
the new structured error messages.
- `tests/tools/test_exec_security.py` keeps the prior `2>/dev/null`
regression and the `> /etc/issue` negative case from the previous
commit on this branch -- they still pass under the new policy.
Coverage status: full pytest 2648 passed / 2 skipped (was 2638 / 2
on origin/main). Ruff is clean for every file touched in this commit.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
PR #3493 promoted every shell `_guard_command` rejection to a turn-fatal
RuntimeError. The two heuristic outputs in that list -- `path outside
working dir` and `path traversal detected` -- routinely false-positive on
benign constructs (e.g. `2>/dev/null`, quoted `..` arguments to sed/find,
absolute paths inside inline scripts), so legitimate workspace commands
silently kill the user's turn (#3599) and the agent never gets a chance
to retry with a different approach (#3605).
Two changes, both narrowly scoped:
- `ExecTool._guard_command` now skips a small allow-list of kernel device
files (`/dev/null`, the standard streams, `/dev/random`, `/dev/fd/N`,
...) before the workspace path check, matched against the pre-resolve
string so symlinks like `/dev/stderr -> /proc/self/fd/2` still hit the
allow-list. Real outside writes such as `> /etc/issue` remain blocked.
- `AgentRunner._WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS` keeps only the four hard
path-resolution errors from filesystem.py / shell.py and the SSRF
marker. The two heuristic substrings move out of the fatal list, so
the LLM sees them as ordinary tool errors and can self-correct in the
next iteration. SSRF stays fatal because retrying an internal URL
with a different phrasing would defeat the safety boundary.
Tests:
- `tests/tools/test_exec_security.py`: parametrized regression for the
exact #3599 command sample plus other stdio redirects and device
reads; explicit negative case asserts `> /etc/issue` is still blocked.
- `tests/agent/test_runner.py`: `_is_workspace_violation` no longer
fatals on the two heuristic markers, plus an end-to-end case proving
the runner hands the guard error back to the LLM and finalizes the
next turn cleanly.
Keep the new turn-end signal scoped to WebSocket clients, preserve pending tool-call state across trailing tool result rows, and drop the accidental npm lockfile from the Bun-based WebUI.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: allow_patterns take priority over deny_patterns in ExecTool
Previously deny_patterns were checked first with no bypass, meaning
allow_patterns could never exempt commands from the built-in deny list.
This made it impossible to whitelist destructive commands for specific
directories (e.g. build/cleanup tasks).
Changes:
- shell.py: check allow_patterns first; if matched, skip deny check
- shell.py: deny_patterns now appends to built-in list (not replaces)
- schema.py: add allow_patterns/deny_patterns to ExecToolConfig
- loop.py/subagent.py: pass allow_patterns/deny_patterns to ExecTool
- Add test_exec_allow_patterns.py covering priority semantics
* fix: separate deny pattern errors from workspace violation detection
The deny pattern error message "Command blocked by safety guard" was
included in _WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS, causing deny_pattern blocks to be
misclassified as fatal workspace violations. This meant LLMs had no
chance to retry with a different command — the turn was aborted
immediately.
Changes:
- shell.py: deny/allowlist error messages now use distinct phrasing
("blocked by deny pattern filter" / "blocked by allowlist filter")
- runner.py: remove "blocked by safety guard" from
_WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS so deny_pattern errors are treated as normal
tool errors (LLM can retry) instead of fatal violations
- workspace path errors still use "blocked by safety guard" and remain
fatal as intended
* fix: update test assertions to match new deny pattern error message
* fix: indentation error in test file
* fix: restore SSRF fatal classification and tidy exec pattern plumbing
Address review feedback on the deny/allow_patterns rework:
- runner.py: re-add "internal/private url detected" to
_WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS. The earlier marker removal also stripped
fatal classification from SSRF / internal-URL rejections (whose
message still says "blocked by safety guard"), turning a hard
security boundary into something the LLM could retry.
- loop.py / subagent.py: drop `or None` between ExecToolConfig and
ExecTool. The schema default is an empty list and ExecTool already
normalizes None back to [], so the indirection was a no-op.
- shell.py: extract `explicitly_allowed` flag in _guard_command so
allow_patterns are scanned once instead of twice and the control
flow no longer relies on a no-op `pass + else` branch.
- tests/agent/test_runner.py: add a regression test asserting that
the SSRF block message is treated as fatal, while deny/allowlist
filter messages are deliberately non-fatal.
* fix: remove unused exec allow-pattern test import
Keep the new ExecTool allow-pattern coverage clean under ruff.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Xubin Ren <xubinrencs@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Treat workspace and safety guard failures as fatal regardless of whether they arrive from tool preparation, returned tool output, or raised exceptions.
Made-with: Cursor
The max_messages config field in AgentDefaults was accepted by the
schema but never threaded through to the actual get_history() calls
in the agent loop. Both call sites in _process_message hardcoded the
default, so sessions with slow or local models accumulated unbounded
history that inflated prompt tokens and caused LLM timeouts.
Changes:
- Add max_messages field to AgentDefaults (default 0 = use built-in
constant, any positive value caps history replay)
- Store the value on AgentLoop and pass it to get_history() when
non-zero
- Wire the config through all three AgentLoop construction sites in
commands.py (gateway, API server, CLI chat)
- 14 focused tests covering schema validation, init storage, history
slicing, boundary alignment, integration wiring, and the
zero/default path
Move sessionHistoryMaxMessages, sessionHistoryMaxTokens, and
sessionFileMaxMessages out of user-facing config into internal
constants (HISTORY_MAX_MESSAGES=120, FILE_MAX_MESSAGES=2000).
- Remove 3 fields from AgentDefaults and config pipeline
- Sink enforce_file_cap into Session (was AgentLoop)
- Auto-derive token budget from context window (was configurable)
- Net -113 lines across 7 files; 723 tests green
Made-with: Cursor
Past assistant turns in history were prefixed with "[Message Time: ...]"
just like user turns. The model treated these as in-context demos and
started prefixing its own replies with the same marker, leaking
metadata to the user. Prompt-level warnings could not beat dozens of
prior assistant samples.
Annotate only user turns and proactive deliveries
(_channel_delivery=True, i.e. cron / heartbeat pushes whose timing is
the whole point and which are too infrequent to act as demos). Adjacent
user-side timestamps still pin every normal assistant reply for
relative-time reasoning. The now-redundant identity.md warning is
removed along with the demonstration source.
MCP resource/prompt/tool names containing spaces or special characters
(e.g. "PostgreSQL System Information") were forwarded verbatim to model
provider APIs, causing validation errors from both Anthropic and OpenAI
which require names matching ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128}$.
Add _sanitize_name() that replaces invalid characters with underscores
and collapses consecutive underscores. Applied in MCPToolWrapper,
MCPResourceWrapper, MCPPromptWrapper constructors and the enabled_tools
filtering logic.
Closes#3468
Capture Slack thread metadata for cron and message-tool deliveries so replies stay in the originating thread, and hydrate first thread mentions with recent Slack context.
Made-with: Cursor
Include persisted turn timestamps when assembling LLM prompts so relative-date references like yesterday and today have concrete anchors.
Made-with: Cursor
