nanobot/tests/tools/test_exec_security.py

184 lines
6.3 KiB
Python

"""Tests for exec tool internal URL blocking."""
from __future__ import annotations
import socket
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from nanobot.agent.tools.shell import ExecTool
def _fake_resolve_private(hostname, port, family=0, type_=0):
return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, "", ("169.254.169.254", 0))]
def _fake_resolve_localhost(hostname, port, family=0, type_=0):
return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0))]
def _fake_resolve_public(hostname, port, family=0, type_=0):
return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_blocks_curl_metadata():
tool = ExecTool()
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_private):
result = await tool.execute(
command='curl -s -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/'
)
assert "Error" in result
assert "internal" in result.lower() or "private" in result.lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_blocks_wget_localhost():
tool = ExecTool()
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_localhost):
result = await tool.execute(command="wget http://localhost:8080/secret -O /tmp/out")
assert "Error" in result
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_allows_normal_commands():
tool = ExecTool(timeout=5)
result = await tool.execute(command="echo hello")
assert "hello" in result
assert "Error" not in result.split("\n")[0]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_allows_curl_to_public_url():
"""Commands with public URLs should not be blocked by the internal URL check."""
tool = ExecTool()
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_public):
guard_result = tool._guard_command("curl https://example.com/api", "/tmp")
assert guard_result is None
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_blocks_chained_internal_url():
"""Internal URLs buried in chained commands should still be caught."""
tool = ExecTool()
with patch("nanobot.security.network.socket.getaddrinfo", _fake_resolve_private):
result = await tool.execute(
command="echo start && curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ && echo done"
)
assert "Error" in result
# --- #2989: block writes to nanobot internal state files -----------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"command",
[
"cat foo >> history.jsonl",
"echo '{}' > history.jsonl",
"echo '{}' > memory/history.jsonl",
"echo '{}' > ./workspace/memory/history.jsonl",
"tee -a history.jsonl < foo",
"tee history.jsonl",
"cp /tmp/fake.jsonl history.jsonl",
"mv backup.jsonl memory/history.jsonl",
"dd if=/dev/zero of=memory/history.jsonl",
"sed -i 's/old/new/' history.jsonl",
"echo x > .dream_cursor",
"cp /tmp/x memory/.dream_cursor",
],
)
def test_exec_blocks_writes_to_history_jsonl(command):
"""Direct writes to history.jsonl / .dream_cursor must be blocked (#2989)."""
tool = ExecTool()
result = tool._guard_command(command, "/tmp")
assert result is not None
assert "dangerous pattern" in result.lower()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"command",
[
"cat history.jsonl",
"wc -l history.jsonl",
"tail -n 5 history.jsonl",
"grep foo history.jsonl",
"ls memory/",
"echo history.jsonl",
],
)
def test_exec_allows_reads_of_history_jsonl(command):
"""Read-only access to history.jsonl must still be allowed."""
tool = ExecTool()
result = tool._guard_command(command, "/tmp")
assert result is None
# --- #2826: working_dir must not escape the configured workspace ---------
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_blocks_working_dir_outside_workspace(tmp_path):
"""An LLM-supplied working_dir outside the workspace must be rejected."""
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=True)
result = await tool.execute(command="rm calendar.ics", working_dir="/etc")
assert "outside the configured workspace" in result
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_blocks_absolute_rm_via_hijacked_working_dir(tmp_path):
"""Regression for #2826: `rm /abs/path` via working_dir hijack."""
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
victim_dir = tmp_path / "outside"
victim_dir.mkdir()
victim = victim_dir / "file.ics"
victim.write_text("data")
tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=True)
result = await tool.execute(
command=f"rm {victim}",
working_dir=str(victim_dir),
)
assert "outside the configured workspace" in result
assert victim.exists(), "victim file must not have been deleted"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_allows_working_dir_within_workspace(tmp_path):
"""A working_dir that is a subdirectory of the workspace is fine."""
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
subdir = workspace / "project"
subdir.mkdir(parents=True)
tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=True, timeout=5)
result = await tool.execute(command="echo ok", working_dir=str(subdir))
assert "ok" in result
assert "outside the configured workspace" not in result
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_allows_working_dir_equal_to_workspace(tmp_path):
"""Passing working_dir equal to the workspace root must be allowed."""
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=True, timeout=5)
result = await tool.execute(command="echo ok", working_dir=str(workspace))
assert "ok" in result
assert "outside the configured workspace" not in result
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_exec_ignores_workspace_check_when_not_restricted(tmp_path):
"""Without restrict_to_workspace, the LLM may still choose any working_dir."""
workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
workspace.mkdir()
other = tmp_path / "other"
other.mkdir()
tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=False, timeout=5)
result = await tool.execute(command="echo ok", working_dir=str(other))
assert "ok" in result
assert "outside the configured workspace" not in result