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https://github.com/HKUDS/nanobot.git
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fix(docker): prevent privilege regain after bootstrap
Co-authored-by: yu-xin-c <175149126+yu-xin-c@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -189,10 +189,47 @@ jobs:
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- name: Build image with default channel dependencies
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run: docker build -t nanobot:test .
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- name: Verify Docker Compose startup
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- name: Verify Docker Compose startup and privilege boundary
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env:
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HOME: ${{ runner.temp }}
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run: docker compose run --rm --no-deps --build -T nanobot-cli status
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run: |
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docker compose run --rm --no-deps --build -T nanobot-cli status
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docker compose run --rm --no-deps -T --entrypoint sh nanobot-cli -s <<'OUTER'
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set -eu
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field() {
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awk -v key="$1:" '$1 == key { print $2 }' /proc/self/status
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}
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test "$(id -u)" = "0"
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test "$(field NoNewPrivs)" = "1"
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setpriv --reuid=nanobot --regid=nanobot --init-groups sh -s <<'INNER'
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set -eu
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field() {
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awk -v key="$1:" '$1 == key { print $2 }' /proc/self/status
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}
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test "$(id -u)" = "1000"
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test "$(field NoNewPrivs)" = "1"
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for capability_set in CapInh CapPrm CapEff CapAmb; do
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test "$(field "$capability_set")" = "0000000000000000"
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done
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INNER
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OUTER
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docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.bwrap.yml \
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run --rm --no-deps -T --entrypoint sh nanobot-cli -s <<'BWRAP'
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set -eu
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mkdir -p /home/nanobot/.nanobot/workspace
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chown -R nanobot:nanobot /home/nanobot/.nanobot
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setpriv --reuid=nanobot --regid=nanobot --init-groups \
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bwrap --new-session --die-with-parent \
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--ro-bind /usr /usr \
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--ro-bind-try /bin /bin \
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--ro-bind-try /lib /lib \
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--ro-bind-try /lib64 /lib64 \
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--proc /proc --dev /dev --tmpfs /tmp \
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--bind /home/nanobot/.nanobot/workspace /home/nanobot/.nanobot/workspace \
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--chdir /home/nanobot/.nanobot/workspace \
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-- sh -c 'test "$(id -u)" = 1000; touch sandbox-ok'
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test -f /home/nanobot/.nanobot/workspace/sandbox-ok
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BWRAP
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- name: Verify default WhatsApp dependencies
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run: docker run --rm --entrypoint python nanobot:test -c "import neonize, segno"
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@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ x-common-config: &common-config
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- CHOWN
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- SETGID
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- SETUID
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# Prevent the non-root process from regaining capabilities through setuid
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# binaries or file capabilities left inside the container image.
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security_opt:
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- no-new-privileges:true
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services:
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nanobot-gateway:
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+13
-6
@@ -160,8 +160,11 @@ docker compose logs -f nanobot-gateway # view logs
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docker compose down # stop
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```
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The default Compose file drops all Linux capabilities and keeps Docker's default
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AppArmor/seccomp profiles enabled. If you explicitly set
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The default Compose file drops all Linux capabilities except `CHOWN`, `SETUID`, and
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`SETGID`, which the root entrypoint needs to fix bind-mount ownership and become UID
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1000. It also enables `no-new-privileges`, so the non-root process cannot regain those
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bootstrap capabilities through setuid binaries or file capabilities. Docker's default
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AppArmor/seccomp profiles remain enabled. If you explicitly set
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`"tools.exec.sandbox": "bwrap"` in `~/.nanobot/config.json`, add the bwrap
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override file when starting containers:
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@@ -170,9 +173,9 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.bwrap.yml up -d nanobot-g
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docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.bwrap.yml run --rm nanobot-cli agent -m "Hello!"
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```
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The override grants `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` and disables AppArmor/seccomp confinement for
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the container so bubblewrap can create its nested namespaces. Use it only when the
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bwrap sandbox is enabled.
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The override adds `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` and disables AppArmor/seccomp confinement for the
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container so bubblewrap can create its nested namespaces. It preserves
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`no-new-privileges`. Use it only when the bwrap sandbox is enabled.
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### Docker
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@@ -197,6 +200,8 @@ vim ~/.nanobot/config.json
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# health endpoint on 18790.
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docker run \
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--cap-drop ALL \
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--cap-add CHOWN --cap-add SETGID --cap-add SETUID \
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--security-opt no-new-privileges:true \
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-v ~/.nanobot:/home/nanobot/.nanobot \
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-p 18790:18790 -p 8765:8765 \
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nanobot gateway
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@@ -205,7 +210,9 @@ docker run \
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# bubblewrap needs for nested namespaces. Without them, `bwrap` may exit with
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# `clone3: Operation not permitted`.
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docker run \
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--cap-drop ALL --cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
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--cap-drop ALL \
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--cap-add CHOWN --cap-add SETGID --cap-add SETUID --cap-add SYS_ADMIN \
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--security-opt no-new-privileges:true \
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--security-opt apparmor=unconfined \
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--security-opt seccomp=unconfined \
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-v ~/.nanobot:/home/nanobot/.nanobot \
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