nanobot/docs/websocket.md

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# WebSocket Server Channel
Nanobot can act as a WebSocket server, allowing external clients (web apps, CLIs, scripts) to interact with the agent in real time via persistent connections.
## Features
- Bidirectional real-time communication over WebSocket
- Streaming support — receive agent responses token by token
- Token-based authentication (static tokens and short-lived issued tokens)
- Multi-chat multiplexing — one connection can run many concurrent `chat_id`s
- TLS/SSL support (WSS) with enforced TLSv1.2 minimum
- Client allow-list via `allowFrom`
- Auto-cleanup of dead connections
## Quick Start
### 1. Configure
The WebSocket channel is enabled by default. Add only the fields you want to
override under `channels.websocket`:
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 8765,
"path": "/",
"tokenIssueSecret": "your-webui-password",
"websocketRequiresToken": true,
"allowFrom": ["*"],
"streaming": true
}
}
}
```
### 2. Start nanobot
```bash
nanobot gateway
```
You should see:
```text
WebSocket server listening on ws://127.0.0.1:8765/
```
### 3. Connect a client
```bash
# Using websocat
websocat ws://127.0.0.1:8765/?client_id=alice
# Using Python
import asyncio, json, websockets
async def main():
async with websockets.connect("ws://127.0.0.1:8765/?client_id=alice") as ws:
ready = json.loads(await ws.recv())
print(ready) # {"event": "ready", "chat_id": "...", "client_id": "alice"}
await ws.send(json.dumps({"content": "Hello nanobot!"}))
reply = json.loads(await ws.recv())
print(reply["text"])
asyncio.run(main())
```
## Connection URL
```text
ws://{host}:{port}{path}?client_id={id}&token={token}
```
| Parameter | Required | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| `client_id` | No | Identifier for `allowFrom` authorization. Auto-generated as `anon-xxxxxxxxxxxx` if omitted. Truncated to 128 chars. |
| `token` | Conditional | Authentication token. Required when `websocketRequiresToken` is `true` or `token` (static secret) is configured, unless the request comes through an authenticated `trustedProxyAuth` peer. |
## Wire Protocol
All frames are JSON text. Each message has an `event` field.
### Server → Client
**`ready`** — sent immediately after connection is established:
```json
{
"event": "ready",
"chat_id": "uuid-v4",
"client_id": "alice"
}
```
**`message`** — full agent response:
```json
{
"event": "message",
"chat_id": "uuid-v4",
"text": "Hello! How can I help?",
"media": ["/tmp/image.png"],
"reply_to": "msg-id"
}
```
`media` and `reply_to` are only present when applicable.
**`delta`** — streaming text chunk (only when `streaming: true`):
```json
{
"event": "delta",
"chat_id": "uuid-v4",
"text": "Hello",
"stream_id": "s1"
}
```
**`stream_end`** — signals the end of a streaming segment:
```json
{
"event": "stream_end",
"chat_id": "uuid-v4",
"stream_id": "s1"
}
```
**`reasoning_delta`** — incremental model reasoning / thinking chunk for the active assistant turn. Mirrors `delta` but targets the reasoning bubble above the answer rather than the answer body:
```json
{
"event": "reasoning_delta",
"chat_id": "uuid-v4",
"text": "Let me decompose ",
"stream_id": "r1"
}
```
**`reasoning_end`** — close marker for the active reasoning stream. WebUI uses this to lock the in-place bubble and switch from the shimmer header to a static collapsed state:
```json
{
"event": "reasoning_end",
"chat_id": "uuid-v4",
"stream_id": "r1"
}
```
Reasoning frames only flow when the channel's `showReasoning` is `true` (default) and the model returns reasoning content (DeepSeek-R1 / Kimi / MiMo / OpenAI reasoning models, Anthropic extended thinking, or inline `<think>` / `<thought>` tags). Models without reasoning produce zero `reasoning_delta` frames.
**`runtime_model_updated`** — broadcast when the gateway default runtime changes or
when a config reload requires clients to refresh their model catalog:
```json
{
"event": "runtime_model_updated",
"model_name": "openai/gpt-4.1-mini",
"model_preset": "fast"
}
```
`model_preset` is omitted when no named preset is active. WebUI clients use this event
to refresh model settings after default-runtime and config changes. `/model <preset>`
is session-scoped; its selection is reflected through `session_updated` and the
session row's `model_preset` field instead of this global event.
**`attached`** — confirmation for `new_chat` / `attach` inbound envelopes (see [Multi-chat multiplexing](#multi-chat-multiplexing)):
```json
{"event": "attached", "chat_id": "uuid-v4"}
```
**`error`** — soft error for malformed inbound envelopes. The connection stays open:
```json
{"event": "error", "detail": "invalid chat_id"}
```
### Client → Server
**Legacy (default chat):** send a plain string, or a JSON object with a recognized text field:
```json
"Hello nanobot!"
```
```json
{"content": "Hello nanobot!"}
```
Recognized fields: `content`, `text`, `message` (checked in that order). Invalid JSON is treated as plain text. These frames route to the connection's default `chat_id` (the one announced in `ready`).
**Typed envelopes (multi-chat):** any JSON object with a string `type` field is a typed envelope:
| `type` | Fields | Effect |
|--------|--------|--------|
| `new_chat` | — | Server mints a new `chat_id`, subscribes this connection, replies with `attached`. |
| `attach` | `chat_id` | Subscribe to an existing `chat_id` (e.g. after a page reload). Replies with `attached`. |
| `message` | `chat_id`, `content` | Send `content` on `chat_id`. First use auto-attaches; no explicit `attach` needed. |
See [Multi-chat multiplexing](#multi-chat-multiplexing) for the full flow.
## Configuration Reference
All fields go under `channels.websocket` in `config.json`.
### Connection
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `enabled` | bool | `true` | Enable the WebSocket server. Set to `false` only when you intentionally do not want the bundled WebUI/WebSocket surface. |
| `host` | string | `"127.0.0.1"` | Bind address. Use `"0.0.0.0"` to accept external connections. |
| `port` | int | `8765` | Listen port. |
| `path` | string | `"/"` | WebSocket upgrade path. Trailing slashes are normalized (root `/` is preserved). |
| `maxMessageBytes` | int | `37748736` | Maximum inbound message size in bytes (1 KB 40 MB). Default (36 MB) is sized to accept up to 4 base64-encoded image attachments at 8 MB each; lower it if the channel only carries text. |
### Authentication
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `token` | string | `""` | Static shared secret. When set, clients must provide `?token=<value>` matching this secret (timing-safe comparison). Issued tokens are also accepted as a fallback. A trusted proxy assertion bypasses this requirement. |
| `websocketRequiresToken` | bool | `true` | When `true` and no static `token` is configured, clients must still present a valid issued token, unless `trustedProxyAuth` authenticates the direct proxy peer. Set to `false` to allow unauthenticated connections (only safe for local/trusted networks). |
| `tokenIssuePath` | string | `""` | HTTP path for issuing short-lived tokens. Must differ from `path`. See [Token Issuance](#token-issuance). |
| `tokenIssueSecret` | string | `""` | Secret required to obtain tokens via the issue endpoint. If empty, any client can obtain WebSocket connection tokens from `tokenIssuePath` (logged as a warning). `/webui/bootstrap` issues tokens for local/secret-authenticated requests; trusted-proxy requests intentionally receive no bootstrap or API token. |
| `trustedProxyAuth` | object or `null` | `null` | Optional two-part no-token authorization for a directly connected upstream proxy. Both `trustedPeerCidrs` and a non-empty `assertionHeader` value must match; a CIDR alone never authorizes bootstrap or WebSocket/API access. |
| `trustedProxyAuth.trustedPeerCidrs` | list of CIDR strings | — | Direct TCP peer networks that may present the assertion. IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 peers are supported; universal CIDRs (`0.0.0.0/0`, `::/0`) are rejected. |
| `trustedProxyAuth.assertionHeader` | string | — | HTTP header whose non-empty value proves the upstream proxy authenticated the request. Nanobot trusts this value but does not cryptographically validate it. |
| `tokenTtlS` | int | `300` | Time-to-live for issued tokens in seconds (30 86,400). |
### Access Control
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `allowFrom` | list of string | `["*"]` | Allowed `client_id` values. `"*"` allows all; `[]` denies all. |
### Streaming
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `streaming` | bool | `true` | Enable streaming mode. The agent sends `delta` + `stream_end` frames instead of a single `message`. |
### Keep-alive
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `pingIntervalS` | float | `20.0` | WebSocket ping interval in seconds (5 300). |
| `pingTimeoutS` | float | `20.0` | Time to wait for a pong before closing the connection (5 300). |
### TLS/SSL
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `sslCertfile` | string | `""` | Path to the TLS certificate file (PEM). Both `sslCertfile` and `sslKeyfile` must be set to enable WSS. |
| `sslKeyfile` | string | `""` | Path to the TLS private key file (PEM). Minimum TLS version is enforced as TLSv1.2. |
## Token Issuance
For production deployments where `websocketRequiresToken: true`, use short-lived tokens instead of embedding static secrets in clients.
### How it works
1. Client sends `GET {tokenIssuePath}` with `Authorization: Bearer {tokenIssueSecret}` (or `X-Nanobot-Auth` header).
2. Server responds with a one-time-use token:
```json
{"token": "nbwt_aBcDeFg...", "expires_in": 300}
```
3. Client opens WebSocket with `?token=nbwt_aBcDeFg...&client_id=...`.
4. The token is consumed (single use) and cannot be reused.
The embedded WebUI's `/webui/bootstrap` route returns a WebSocket token and
REST `api_token` for local or secret-authenticated requests. When
`trustedProxyAuth` authenticates the direct proxy peer, it returns connection
metadata only: no bootstrap token, no REST API token, and no token query
parameter is required for the WebSocket handshake or subsequent REST requests.
### Trusted proxy no-token bootstrap
`trustedProxyAuth` is an opt-in alternative for deployments where an
identity-aware reverse proxy authenticates the user before connecting to nanobot.
The proxy assertion becomes the authentication boundary for the entire WebUI
surface: `/webui/bootstrap`, the WebSocket handshake, and REST API routes.
Bootstrap is accepted only when **both** the direct TCP peer matches one of
`trustedPeerCidrs` and the configured assertion header is present and non-empty.
A trusted address by itself is never sufficient.
Nanobot deliberately uses only `connection.remote_address` for the peer check.
It never uses `X-Forwarded-For`, `Forwarded`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP`,
or `X-Forwarded-Host` to decide whether the proxy is trusted. Nanobot trusts the
assertion supplied by the explicitly trusted peer, but does not cryptographically
validate or interpret the JWT/assertion contents. Do not enable this option if
untrusted clients can connect directly to the nanobot listener.
For example, a local Cloudflare Tunnel with Cloudflare Access can validate the
user at the edge and forward the resulting `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`:
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"trustedProxyAuth": {
"trustedPeerCidrs": ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"],
"assertionHeader": "Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion"
}
}
}
}
```
This works only when the directly connected `cloudflared` process reaches
nanobot over the configured loopback address and supplies a non-empty assertion.
Keep nanobot firewalled from untrusted clients; this configuration is not a
CIDR-based bootstrap bypass.
### Example setup
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"port": 8765,
"path": "/ws",
"tokenIssuePath": "/auth/token",
"tokenIssueSecret": "your-secret-here",
"tokenTtlS": 300,
"websocketRequiresToken": true,
"allowFrom": ["*"],
"streaming": true
}
}
}
```
Client flow:
```bash
# 1. Obtain a token
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer your-secret-here" http://127.0.0.1:8765/auth/token
# 2. Connect using the token
websocat "ws://127.0.0.1:8765/ws?client_id=alice&token=nbwt_aBcDeFg..."
```
### Limits
- Issued tokens are single-use — each token can only complete one handshake.
- Outstanding tokens are capped at 10,000. Requests beyond this return HTTP 429.
- Expired tokens are purged lazily on each issue or validation request.
## Multi-chat multiplexing
A single WebSocket can carry many concurrent chats. The server tracks `chat_id -> {connections}` as a fan-out set, so the same chat can also be mirrored across multiple connections (e.g. two browser tabs).
### Typical flow (web UI with a sidebar)
```text
client server
| --- connect --------------------> |
| <-- {"event":"ready", |
| "chat_id":"d3..."} (default)|
| |
| --- {"type":"new_chat"} ---------> |
| <-- {"event":"attached", |
| "chat_id":"a1..."} |
| |
| --- {"type":"message", |
| "chat_id":"a1...", |
| "content":"hi"} ------------> |
| <-- {"event":"delta", ...} |
| <-- {"event":"stream_end", ...} |
| |
| --- {"type":"attach", | # after page reload
| "chat_id":"a1..."} ---------> |
| <-- {"event":"attached", ...} |
```
### Rules
- Every outbound event carries `chat_id`. Clients must dispatch by that field.
- `chat_id` format: `^[A-Za-z0-9_:-]{1,64}$`. Non-matching values return `error`.
- `message` auto-attaches on first use — no separate `attach` is required for chats the server minted (`new_chat`) on the same connection.
- Errors (invalid envelope, unknown `type`, bad `chat_id`) are soft: the server replies with `{"event":"error","detail":"..."}` and keeps the connection open.
### Backward compatibility
Legacy clients that only send plain text or `{"content": ...}` keep working unchanged: those frames route to the connection's default `chat_id` (the one from `ready`). No config flag is needed.
### Security boundary
`chat_id` is a *capability*: anyone holding a valid WebSocket auth credential and the chat_id can attach to that conversation and see its output. This is safe for nanobot's local, single-user model. Multi-tenant deployments should namespace chat_ids per user (or introduce a per-tenant auth gate) — nanobot does not do this today.
## Security Notes
- **Timing-safe comparison**: Static token validation uses `hmac.compare_digest` to prevent timing attacks.
- **Defense in depth**: `allowFrom` is checked at both the HTTP handshake level and the message level.
- **chat_id as capability**: see [Multi-chat multiplexing](#multi-chat-multiplexing). Auth on the WebSocket handshake is the single line of defense; callers who pass it can attach to any chat_id they know.
- **TLS enforcement**: When SSL is enabled, TLSv1.2 is the minimum allowed version.
- **Default-secure**: `websocketRequiresToken` defaults to `true`. Explicitly set it to `false` only on trusted networks.
## Media Files
Outbound `message` events may include a `media` field containing local filesystem paths. Remote clients cannot access these files directly — they need either:
- A shared filesystem mount, or
- An HTTP file server serving the nanobot media directory
## Common Patterns
### Trusted local network (no auth)
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 8765,
"websocketRequiresToken": false,
"allowFrom": ["*"],
"streaming": true
}
}
}
```
### Static token (simple auth)
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"token": "my-shared-secret",
"allowFrom": ["alice", "bob"]
}
}
}
```
Clients connect with `?token=my-shared-secret&client_id=alice`.
### Public endpoint with issued tokens
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 8765,
"path": "/ws",
"tokenIssuePath": "/auth/token",
"tokenIssueSecret": "production-secret",
"websocketRequiresToken": true,
"sslCertfile": "/etc/ssl/certs/server.pem",
"sslKeyfile": "/etc/ssl/private/server-key.pem",
"allowFrom": ["*"]
}
}
}
```
### Custom path
```json
{
"channels": {
"websocket": {
"path": "/chat/ws",
"allowFrom": ["*"]
}
}
}
```
Clients connect to `ws://127.0.0.1:8765/chat/ws?client_id=...`. Trailing slashes are normalized, so `/chat/ws/` works the same.