Keep private URL access blocked at the tool boundary, but return a clear non-retryable hint so the agent can recover conversationally instead of aborting the turn.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
``Nanobot.run()`` has always documented ``RunResult.tools_used`` and
``RunResult.messages`` but actually returned ``[]`` for both, so SDK
consumers could never inspect which tools fired or what the final
message list looked like — the only useful field was ``content``.
This threads the data out via a tiny ``_SDKCaptureHook`` that installs
alongside any user-supplied hooks. The capture hook accumulates tool
names across iterations and snapshots the message list on each
``after_iteration`` call; the last snapshot reflects end-of-turn state.
Only the SDK facade is touched: ``AgentLoop.process_direct`` and
``AgentRunner`` signatures are unchanged, so channels / CLI / API paths
are unaffected.
Replace the asyncio.Semaphore queueing approach with a simple count
check in SpawnTool.execute(). When the concurrency limit is reached,
the tool returns an error string so the agent can perceive the reason
and adjust its behavior instead of silently queueing.
- Remove max_concurrent_subagents parameter threading through
AgentLoop, commands.py, and nanobot.py
- SubagentManager reads the limit directly from AgentDefaults
- SpawnTool checks get_running_count() before calling spawn()
- Simplify tests to verify rejection behavior
Logout previously claimed to support github-copilot in --help text but had
no registered handler, so `provider logout github-copilot` failed with
"Logout not implemented". Add the handler, sharing token deletion with the
codex flow via `_delete_oauth_files`. Tighten handler-table types, fix the
codex test fixture filename, and cover github-copilot plus the unknown
provider path.
- Implement \
anobot provider logout <provider>\ to clear OAuth credentials.
- Add \_LOGOUT_HANDLERS\ registration mechanism mirroring login.
- Implement logout for \openai-codex\ by deleting local \oauth-cli-kit\ token and lock files.
- Fallback gracefully when attempting to logout from providers lacking local credentials or implementations.
- Fixes#2665
Keep the /dev workspace guard exception scoped to the known benign device paths already handled by ExecTool, and add coverage that non-benign /dev targets still get blocked. Also add a streaming regression for tool_error responses so fatal tool failures are delivered by channels instead of being marked as already streamed.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Three independent fixes for issues exposed by PR #3493:
1. shell.py: allow /dev/* paths in workspace guard
Commands like `rm file.txt 2>/dev/null` were blocked because
_extract_absolute_paths captured /dev/null as a path outside
the workspace. Allow /dev like media_path is already allowed.
2. shell.py: remove | from home_paths regex prefix
Loki query operator `|~` was misinterpreted as pipe + home
directory, causing false workspace violation errors.
3. loop.py: change _streamed from blacklist to whitelist
stop_reason "tool_error" was not in the exclusion set
{"ask_user", "error"}, so _streamed=True was set on fatal
errors. channel manager then skipped channel.send() because
it assumed the content was already streamed — but it never
was. Whitelist to only {"stop", "end_turn", "max_tokens"}.
Also fixes a pre-existing Windows bug in _spawn where
create_subprocess_exec + list2cmdline breaks commands with
paths containing spaces (e.g. D:\Program Files\python.exe).
Closes: #3599, #3605
Keep the workspace-boundary changes easier to review by trimming long explanatory comments down to short local notes. Also make the #3599 POSIX command regression skip on Windows and normalize workspace violation signatures to POSIX separators so the throttle tests are platform-stable.
Tests:
- uv run pytest tests/tools/test_exec_security.py tests/utils/test_workspace_violation_throttle.py -q
- uv run pytest -q
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Replaces PR #3493's blanket fatal abort with a "tell the model + throttle
the bypass loop" policy. Workspace-bound rejections are now ordinary
recoverable tool errors enriched with a structured "this is a hard policy
boundary" instruction; SSRF stays the only marker that aborts the turn.
Why the fatal-abort approach broke
----------------------------------
PR #3493 promoted every shell `_guard_command` and filesystem path-resolution
rejection to a turn-fatal RuntimeError. Two of those messages (`path
outside working dir` and `path traversal detected`) are heuristic substring
scans on the raw command, so legitimate commands like `rm <ws>/x.txt
2>/dev/null` or `find . -type f` killed the user's turn (#3599). On
channels with outbound dedupe (Telegram) the user just saw silence (#3605),
and the noise polluted the LLM's context until it started hallucinating
guard rejections on plain relative paths (#3597).
Why we still need *some* throttle
---------------------------------
The original #3493 pain point was real: the LLM, refused once, would
swap tools and try again -- read_file -> exec cat -> exec cp -> bash -c
-> ln -sf -> python -c open(...). Just removing the fatal escape lets
that loop run wild until max_iterations.
What this commit does
---------------------
- `nanobot/utils/runtime.py`: add `workspace_violation_signature` and
`repeated_workspace_violation_error`. The signature normalizes
filesystem `path` arguments and the first absolute path inside an
exec command, so swapping tools against the same outside target hits
the same throttle bucket. Two soft attempts are allowed; the third
attempt's tool result is replaced with a hard "stop trying to bypass"
message that quotes the target path and tells the model to ask the
user for help.
- `nanobot/agent/runner.py`: split classification into `_is_ssrf_violation`
(still fatal) and `_is_workspace_violation` (now soft). All three
failure branches in `_run_tool` (prep_error / exception / Error
result) route through a shared `_classify_violation` that bumps the
per-turn workspace_violation_counts dict and either keeps the tool's
own message or substitutes the throttle escalation. `_execute_tools`
now threads that dict alongside the existing external_lookup_counts.
- `nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py`: append a structured boundary note to
every workspace-bound guard rejection (`working_dir could not be
resolved`, `working_dir is outside`, `path outside working dir`,
`path traversal detected`). SSRF errors stay short and direct so the
model doesn't try to "phrase around" them. Existing `2>/dev/null`
allow-list and benign device passthrough from the previous commit
remain.
- `nanobot/agent/tools/filesystem.py`: append the same boundary note to
the `outside allowed directory` PermissionError so read_file / write_file
/ list_dir errors give the LLM the same explicit hint.
Tests
-----
- `tests/utils/test_workspace_violation_throttle.py` (new): signature
collapses across read_file/exec/python -c against the same path,
different paths get independent budgets, escalation only fires after
the third attempt.
- `tests/agent/test_runner.py`:
- `test_runner_does_not_abort_on_workspace_violation_anymore` -- v2
contract: filesystem PermissionError is now soft, runner moves to
the next iteration and finalizes cleanly.
- `test_is_ssrf_violation_remains_fatal` + the existing
`test_runner_aborts_on_ssrf_violation` -- SSRF still aborts on the
first attempt.
- `test_runner_lets_llm_recover_from_shell_guard_path_outside` -- end
to end recovery from `path outside working dir`.
- `test_runner_throttles_repeated_workspace_bypass_attempts` -- four
bypass attempts against the same outside target produce at least
one `workspace_violation_escalated` event and the run completes
naturally without aborting the turn.
- The two `_execute_tools` direct-call tests now pass the new
workspace_violation_counts dict.
- `tests/tools/test_tool_validation.py`: relax three `==` assertions
to `startswith` + "hard policy boundary" substring check to match
the new structured error messages.
- `tests/tools/test_exec_security.py` keeps the prior `2>/dev/null`
regression and the `> /etc/issue` negative case from the previous
commit on this branch -- they still pass under the new policy.
Coverage status: full pytest 2648 passed / 2 skipped (was 2638 / 2
on origin/main). Ruff is clean for every file touched in this commit.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
PR #3493 promoted every shell `_guard_command` rejection to a turn-fatal
RuntimeError. The two heuristic outputs in that list -- `path outside
working dir` and `path traversal detected` -- routinely false-positive on
benign constructs (e.g. `2>/dev/null`, quoted `..` arguments to sed/find,
absolute paths inside inline scripts), so legitimate workspace commands
silently kill the user's turn (#3599) and the agent never gets a chance
to retry with a different approach (#3605).
Two changes, both narrowly scoped:
- `ExecTool._guard_command` now skips a small allow-list of kernel device
files (`/dev/null`, the standard streams, `/dev/random`, `/dev/fd/N`,
...) before the workspace path check, matched against the pre-resolve
string so symlinks like `/dev/stderr -> /proc/self/fd/2` still hit the
allow-list. Real outside writes such as `> /etc/issue` remain blocked.
- `AgentRunner._WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS` keeps only the four hard
path-resolution errors from filesystem.py / shell.py and the SSRF
marker. The two heuristic substrings move out of the fatal list, so
the LLM sees them as ordinary tool errors and can self-correct in the
next iteration. SSRF stays fatal because retrying an internal URL
with a different phrasing would defeat the safety boundary.
Tests:
- `tests/tools/test_exec_security.py`: parametrized regression for the
exact #3599 command sample plus other stdio redirects and device
reads; explicit negative case asserts `> /etc/issue` is still blocked.
- `tests/agent/test_runner.py`: `_is_workspace_violation` no longer
fatals on the two heuristic markers, plus an end-to-end case proving
the runner hands the guard error back to the LLM and finalizes the
next turn cleanly.
Two related bugs that together caused scheduled jobs to disappear after
a container restart:
1. `_save_store()` used `Path.write_text(...)`, which truncates the
destination in place. A SIGKILL or shutdown mid-write left
`jobs.json` either truncated or corrupt.
2. `_load_jobs()` caught any parse error, logged at WARNING, and
returned an empty list. `start()` then called `_save_store()`
immediately, overwriting the corrupt-but-recoverable file with an
empty job array. Every scheduled job was silently lost with only a
single warning line in the log.
Reproduction in production: container restart at 18:08, after which a
job that had fired correctly for two consecutive days never fired
again. jobs.json on disk was missing the job entirely.
Fix:
- `_save_store()` now writes via temp file + `os.replace` + `fsync`
(matches the session manager pattern from 512bf59,
"fix(session): fsync sessions on graceful shutdown to prevent data
loss"). An interrupted write cannot corrupt the live file.
- `_load_jobs()` now moves a corrupt store aside as
`jobs.json.corrupt-<ts>` and returns `None` instead of `[]`.
- `start()` aborts with a `RuntimeError` when the on-disk store is
corrupt, instead of starting empty and overwriting.
- `_load_store()` falls back to the previous in-memory snapshot when
a hot reload encounters a corrupt file, so a transient corruption
after start does not drop live jobs.
Tests cover the atomic-write path, the corrupt-file preservation,
the start-time refusal, the in-memory fallback, and a basic save/load
round trip across two service instances. Existing 79 cron tests and
full suite (2553 tests) still pass.
Keep provider retry wait messages on the interactive progress path so they do not fall through as assistant responses.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Restore the npm lockfile that is already present on main so this PR only carries the WebUI turn-completion changes.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Keep the new turn-end signal scoped to WebSocket clients, preserve pending tool-call state across trailing tool result rows, and drop the accidental npm lockfile from the Bun-based WebUI.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: allow_patterns take priority over deny_patterns in ExecTool
Previously deny_patterns were checked first with no bypass, meaning
allow_patterns could never exempt commands from the built-in deny list.
This made it impossible to whitelist destructive commands for specific
directories (e.g. build/cleanup tasks).
Changes:
- shell.py: check allow_patterns first; if matched, skip deny check
- shell.py: deny_patterns now appends to built-in list (not replaces)
- schema.py: add allow_patterns/deny_patterns to ExecToolConfig
- loop.py/subagent.py: pass allow_patterns/deny_patterns to ExecTool
- Add test_exec_allow_patterns.py covering priority semantics
* fix: separate deny pattern errors from workspace violation detection
The deny pattern error message "Command blocked by safety guard" was
included in _WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS, causing deny_pattern blocks to be
misclassified as fatal workspace violations. This meant LLMs had no
chance to retry with a different command — the turn was aborted
immediately.
Changes:
- shell.py: deny/allowlist error messages now use distinct phrasing
("blocked by deny pattern filter" / "blocked by allowlist filter")
- runner.py: remove "blocked by safety guard" from
_WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS so deny_pattern errors are treated as normal
tool errors (LLM can retry) instead of fatal violations
- workspace path errors still use "blocked by safety guard" and remain
fatal as intended
* fix: update test assertions to match new deny pattern error message
* fix: indentation error in test file
* fix: restore SSRF fatal classification and tidy exec pattern plumbing
Address review feedback on the deny/allow_patterns rework:
- runner.py: re-add "internal/private url detected" to
_WORKSPACE_BLOCK_MARKERS. The earlier marker removal also stripped
fatal classification from SSRF / internal-URL rejections (whose
message still says "blocked by safety guard"), turning a hard
security boundary into something the LLM could retry.
- loop.py / subagent.py: drop `or None` between ExecToolConfig and
ExecTool. The schema default is an empty list and ExecTool already
normalizes None back to [], so the indirection was a no-op.
- shell.py: extract `explicitly_allowed` flag in _guard_command so
allow_patterns are scanned once instead of twice and the control
flow no longer relies on a no-op `pass + else` branch.
- tests/agent/test_runner.py: add a regression test asserting that
the SSRF block message is treated as fatal, while deny/allowlist
filter messages are deliberately non-fatal.
* fix: remove unused exec allow-pattern test import
Keep the new ExecTool allow-pattern coverage clean under ruff.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Xubin Ren <xubinrencs@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The Anthropic SDK raises a client-side ValueError when a non-streaming
`messages.create` call could exceed the 10-minute server timeout (e.g.
high `max_tokens` combined with extended thinking budget). The error
text "Streaming is required for operations that may take longer than
10 minutes" was bubbling up to the user as an opaque LLM error in
channels that use the non-stream path (e.g. wecom in #2709).
Detect this specific ValueError in `chat()` and transparently retry
through `chat_stream()` (without `on_content_delta` so behavior matches
the non-stream contract). Other ValueErrors continue to flow through
`_handle_error` unchanged.
Closes#2709
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the Matrix homeserver returns M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN / M_FORBIDDEN /
M_UNAUTHORIZED (or soft_logout), the previous _sync_loop kept retrying
sync_forever every 2 seconds forever, spamming the homeserver and
filling logs (#1851). The auth state cannot recover by retrying, so
this is pure noise and a soft DoS on the homeserver.
- Extract `_is_fatal_auth_response()` helper
- In `_on_sync_error`, on fatal auth: set `_running=False` and call
`stop_sync_forever()` so the loop exits cleanly
- Add exponential backoff (2s → 60s cap) to the generic exception path
in `_sync_loop` so transient network blips also stop hammering
Closes#1851
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
LLM-generated tool calls may wrap URLs in markdown backticks or quotes
(e.g. \https://example.com\), causing urlparse to produce empty scheme
and netloc, which leads to all fetch attempts failing silently.
Add URL cleaning at the top of WebFetchTool.execute to strip whitespace,
backticks, double quotes, and single quotes, plus an early rejection guard
for non-http(s) URLs after cleaning.
